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N RECENT DECADES THERE HAS BEEN a great deal of interest 
in virtue ethics, broadly construed. There are, of course, many different 
such theories, and some dispute over what conditions a theory must 
meet to qualify as a virtue ethics.1 In what follows, I respond to a set of basic 
objections to a paradigmatic set of such theories – those virtue ethics accord-
ing to which moral properties such as rightness and goodness (and their cor-
responding concepts) are to be explained in terms of the virtues or virtuous 
agents (and similarly with their corresponding concepts).  
The basic intuition underlying the objections is that our virtue concepts 
(or, indeed, the concept of a virtue, tout court) must be derivative from other, 
more fundamental moral concepts. Similarly, the virtues themselves – as well 
as their value – are thought to be best understood in terms of the right or the 
good. Virtue theorists have, in some way, confused cart and horse. Conse-
quentialists will treat the virtues as character traits that serve to maximize (or 
produce sufficient quantities of) the good, where the good is taken as 
explanatorily basic. Deontologists will understand the virtues in terms of dis-
positions to respect and act in accordance with moral rules, or to perform 
morally right actions, where these moral rules or right actions are fundamen-
tal. Furthermore, the virtues will be considered valuable just insofar as they 
involve such tendencies to maximize the good or to perform right actions.  
In contrast, the forms of virtue ethics that I wish to defend would satisfy 
the following four conditions: 
 
(i) The concepts of rightness and goodness would be explained in terms of virtue 
concepts (or the concept of a virtuous agent). 
(ii) Rightness and goodness would be explained in terms of the virtues or virtuous 
agents. 
(iii) The explanatory primacy of the virtues or virtuous agents (and virtue con-
cepts) would reflect a metaphysical dependence of rightness and goodness 
upon the virtues or virtuous agents.  
(iv) The virtues or virtuous agents themselves – as well as their value – could (but 
need not) be explained in terms of further states, such as health, eudaimonia, 
etc., but where these further states do not require an appeal to rightness or 
goodness.2 
                                                 
1 For a recent effort to provide a taxonomy, see Sean McAleer, “An Aristotelian Account of 
Virtue Ethics: An Essay in Moral Taxonomy,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2007), 208-
225. See also Michael Slote, Morals from Motives (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 
and Gary Watson, “On the Primacy of Character” in Owen Flanagan and Amelie Rorty, 
eds., Identity, Character, and Morality (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 449-70. 
2 With the inclusion of this condition we capture those virtue ethics that Slote refers to as 
agent-prior (where the virtues or virtuous agents are explained in terms of further states, 
such as flourishing), in addition to those theories that Slote refers to as agent-based (where 
the virtues or virtuous agents are treated as basic, without further explanation). See Slote 
(2001), 3-10.  
I 
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“Rightness” in the above can be taken as standing in for all deontic statuses 
(that is, for example, wrongness is also to be treated in terms of the virtues or 
perhaps the vices); similarly, “goodness” can be taken as standing in for bad-
ness, and other such axiological statuses. One qualification is in order with 
respect to states such as eudaimonia or health. These might appear to be in-
stances of goodness; however here we can draw a distinction between the 
goodness of a kind (particularly as a good agent or good creature of some 
kind) as reflected in health or flourishing (one is a healthy human, or is leading 
a good human life), versus goodness tout court. Only the latter instances of 
goodness are to be taken to be dependent upon the virtuous or virtuous 
agents for present purposes.3  
It is worth stressing that not all theories that could plausibly be under-
stood as forms of virtue ethics would satisfy the above conditions; the cur-
rent goal is not to defend all possible virtue ethics. Rather, we are examining 
what might be taken to be among the more radical possible forms of virtue 
ethics, particularly in treating the virtues as explanatorily prior both to right-
ness and to goodness tout court. Why focus on these more radical forms? 
First, several prominent virtue ethics can be understood as satisfying the 
above conditions, including those of Michael Slote, Linda Zagzebski, and, 
perhaps (if controversially), Aristotle’s paradigmatic virtue ethics.4 Beyond 
this, many of the arguments presented here could be taken on board by those 
defending more moderate forms of virtue ethics, such as Rosalind Hurst-
house or Christine Swanton (against those who would attempt to argue for 
the explanatory primacy of the right or of the good, for example).5 Thus the 
range of interest for most of these arguments will extend beyond those fo-
cusing on the more radical approaches. 
The paper consists of four main sections, each dealing in depth with 
particular variations of the underlying worry that our virtue concepts must be 
derivative from other, more fundamental moral concepts (and similarly with 
the virtues themselves and other moral properties):  
                                                 
3 Thus the recent virtue consquentialisms of Julia Driver and others would not satisfy these 
conditions, insofar as they treat the virtues in terms of producing the good (where this pre-
sumably includes states other than goods of a kind such as health or flourishing). See Julia 
Driver, Uneasy Virtue (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
4 Michael Slote (2001), and “Sentimentalist Virtue and Moral Judgement: Outline of a Pro-
ject,” Metaphilosophy 34 (2003), 131-43. See also Linda Zagzebski, Divine Motivation Theory 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). McAleer (2007) provides an interpretation 
of Aristotle that would be congenial to this claim.  
5 Hursthouse explicitly rejects attempts to “reduce or derive” all moral concepts to / from 
virtue concepts (or any others, including the right or the good); see her “Are Virtues the 
Proper Starting Point for Morality?” in James Dreier, ed., Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), 99-112; see in particular 100-1. For a more complete exposi-
tion of her approach, see Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1999). For target-centered accounts of the virtues, see Christine Swanton, Virtue 
Ethics: A Pluralistic View (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), and Ronald Sandler, 
Character and Environment: A Virtue-Oriented Approach to Environmental Ethics (New York: Co-
lumbia University Press, 2007). 
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(i) That the virtues can be properly explained as simple dispositions to 
perform right actions or promote the good (as reflected in our ability 
to pick out agents as virtuous by the acts they perform), where right-
ness or goodness are thus explanatorily primary;  
(ii) That we can identify certain actions as morally right without appeal to 
virtuous agents – suggesting a primacy of the right, where right actions 
are not properly understood in terms of the virtues or virtuous agents 
(contrary to claims that the virtues would be explanatorily primary);  
(iii) That we can identify certain states of affairs as good (or not), without 
appeal to virtuous agents and, furthermore, that appeal to virtuous 
agents to explain such value seems implausible (and not merely redun-
dant) – suggesting a primacy of the good; and 
(iv) That virtue ethics face a dilemma – either virtuous agents are consis-
tent in their actions and valuations – in which case the best explana-
tion of this is that they are reacting to antecedently right actions or 
good states of affairs (and thus the virtues or virtuous agents would 
not be explanatorily primary), or they are not guided by prior right ac-
tions or good states of affairs. If so, the virtuous would be arbitrary 
and potentially inconsistent in their actions and valuations (thus ren-
dering virtue ethics implausible).  
 
In the concluding section I acknowledge final, broader issues that will ulti-
mately need to be addressed in arriving at a viable virtue ethics (of the radical 
kind defended here). I do not attempt to fully answer these final questions in 
this paper; my goal is instead to address the prominent, fundamental objec-
tions to virtue ethics discussed in sections I – IV. 
 
I 
 
A simple version of the first objection is grounded in moral epistemology. 
When we identify honest people, benevolent people, and so on, we typically 
pick them out by the very fact that they perform honest or benevolent ac-
tions. Thus, we identify virtuous persons (or their possession of given vir-
tues) through their performance of certain kinds of actions; as such, these 
right actions are explanatorily basic or primary, and the virtues are derivative 
and best understood as dispositions to perform these actions. Or so the ob-
jection would run. 
Still, even if it were true that we identified the possession of various vir-
tues primarily through agents performing certain characteristic kinds of ac-
tions, this would not demonstrate that benevolent actions are explanatorily 
prior to benevolence. To see this, compare the case of a disease and its symp-
toms. Clearly, we often identify the presence of a disease through its symp-
toms, yet we would not claim that these symptoms cause or explain the pres-
ence of the disease. And when we examine our concepts of disease and 
symptom, we best explain the notion of a symptom in terms of the more ba-
sic concept of a disease – even if we have better epistemic access to the pres-
ence of actual symptoms than to the presence of the more fundamental dis-
ease. 
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Similarly, in the case of the virtues, while we might use certain kinds of 
actions to pick out those who possess the virtues, we can readily hold that 
these sorts of actions are seen as honest or benevolent simply insofar as they 
are actions that would be characteristic of virtuous agents. Put another way, 
we can use virtuous actions as a heuristic in identifying virtuous agents, but 
we can use these actions in this way precisely because they are the sorts of 
actions that virtuous agents would perform. Furthermore, and crucially, we 
must distinguish between how we identify those who possess the virtues, and 
how we are to understand the relationships between rightness and virtue (and 
also the relationships among our various moral concepts). The epistemic 
methods we use to identify virtuous agents do not necessarily reflect the 
structure of our moral conceptual framework or the most plausible explana-
tory relationships between virtues and actions or states of affairs. 
The objection could be modified now to the claim that virtues could not 
ultimately be anything more than dispositions to perform certain sorts of ac-
tions. If so, the analogy with diseases and symptoms would break down, as 
(unlike a disease that is more complex than a mere disposition to produce 
certain symptoms) there would be nothing more to a virtue than its produc-
tion of right actions. We might call this “reductive deontologism.” One could 
insist that benevolence simply is a disposition to perform actions which im-
prove the well-being of others (and perhaps oneself); there would be no 
“remainder” to benevolence beyond this.6 And similar claims could be made 
concerning other virtues – honesty, justice, and so on. 
In response, consider a case in which a person loves another, perhaps a 
romantic love. And now consider how we should understand the actions of 
this person, or those who love in this way. An understanding analogous to 
that of reductive deontologists with respect to the virtues would have us hold 
that loving people are simply those who are disposed to perform independ-
ently grounded loving actions. To be in love would be a matter of perform-
ing (or being disposed to perform, under appropriate circumstances) such 
actions as sending flowers or what-have-you. Or perhaps there could be rules 
of love, such that being in love is simply a matter of acting in accordance 
with these rules…. But surely this sort of approach cannot be correct. 
Rather, we characterize actions as loving precisely because they are the sorts 
of actions that people in love might commonly perform. And notice that 
while we could well come to believe that a given person is in love with an-
other on the basis of her actions, this does nothing to show that we ought to 
understand her being in love as merely a disposition to perform certain sorts 
of actions. Loving actions are the actions that flow out of the rich emotional 
                                                 
6 Or, if there were any such remainder, it would not be sufficient to allow the virtues to be 
explanatorily basic. 
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state of being in love; love is not a mere disposition to perform particular 
actions or follow a set of rules.7 
We have then a case where it is clearly mistaken to understand a com-
plex inner state as a mere disposition to perform certain independently iden-
tified actions. Virtue theorists8 can hold that we should understand the vir-
tues in a similar fashion. Honest people are not merely disposed to perform 
independently grounded honest actions, any more than loving people are 
merely disposed to perform independently grounded loving actions. We 
could perhaps develop this point further by understanding honesty as a love 
of truth, benevolence as a general love of others (perhaps a form of agape), 
and so on. Of course, this is merely suggestive, and an analysis of the loves 
involved would be essential.9  
But our main point remains – there is no reason to hold that virtue theo-
rists must be placing the cart before the horse in holding that the virtues are 
explanatorily basic to their corresponding actions. The relationship between 
loving and loving actions can serve, at the very least, as a model for the virtue 
theorists’ understanding of the relationship between the virtues and virtuous 
actions. This is not yet to show that they are correct in appealing to this 
model; but my goal here is simply to remove initial, intuitive objections that 
suggest that any pure virtue theory must be mistaken. 
We can also appeal to recent work by Christine Swanton in rejecting 
construals of the virtues as mere dispositions to perform right actions.10 
Swanton argues that virtues, properly understood, involve a range of “modes 
of moral responsiveness.” She writes:  
 
[The virtues] recognize that we are not only agents who are active in changing the 
world by promoting good (often at the expense of causing harm), but also agents 
who love and respect (often at the expense of maximizing good). Finally, they ac-
cept that we are not only active beings hell-bent on change, but are also passive in a 
sense: in our openness to, receptivity to, and appreciation of value and things.11 
                                                 
7 A parallel reductive consequentialist understanding might hold that a loving person is sim-
ply disposed to perform actions that maximize the well-being of the beloved. But of course 
much more would need to be involved – a desire to be with the beloved, taking pleasure in 
the happiness of the beloved, (typically) a sexual attraction to the beloved, and so on. There 
would be a wide range of affective, conative, and other dispositions involved; loving a per-
son cannot be adequately explained as a mere disposition to perform actions that maximize 
this person’s well-being. 
8 Here, and throughout the body of this paper, “virtue theory” and “virtue theorist” should 
be understood in terms of those theories that meet the relatively demanding criteria noted in 
the introduction. Again, while there are other virtue theories that will not meet these criteria, 
they will not be our focus here. 
9 I do not mean to endorse this proposal (of treating virtues as all involving some form of 
love); it is simply illustrative of how one might develop an account of the virtues.  
10 Swanton (2003). 
11 Swanton (2003), 23. 
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Consider: the virtue of honesty does not consist in a disposition to tell as 
many truths as possible to as many people as possible.12 Drawing upon Swan-
ton’s work, we could understand honest actions as those which would be 
performed (or approved of) by agents who possess the virtue of honesty, 
where this involves an appreciation or love of truth, a respect for other 
agents as autonomous, and so on.13 A person who values truth and respects 
others (in addition to other modes of moral responsiveness) will naturally 
tend to approve of various actions (in addition to being disposed to act in 
various ways); we need not assume that they are simply inclined to perform 
actions independently identified as “honest.”  
Still, we might now press a final variation of the worry that the virtues 
can be reduced to dispositions to perform right actions or to maximize the 
good. Not all deontologists and consequentialists would attempt to reduce 
the virtues to mere dispositions to perform certain actions or to maximize the 
good. They could instead agree that the virtues are much richer dispositions, 
including the range of attitudes and modes of responsiveness suggested by 
Swanton above. But they could also hold that the value of these broader, 
richer virtues is still to be explained in terms of their tendency to issue in 
right actions or good states of affairs, where these latter are treated as foun-
dational or basic. As such, the value of the virtues would still be derivative 
from (and best explained in terms of) antecedently valuable states or actions. 
Important recent work by Thomas Hurka can be seen as providing a ba-
sis for the objection, one where the value of the virtues would be best ex-
plained in terms of the good.14 Hurka provides a recursive account of the vir-
tues, starting with the claim that there are certain basic intrinsic goods: 
 
(BG) Pleasure, knowledge, achievement are intrinsically good.15 
 
The recursive aspect enters as Hurka suggests that certain attitudes toward 
such basic goods themselves are intrinsically good: 
 
(LG) If x is intrinsically good, loving x (desiring, pursuing, or taking pleasure in x) 
for itself is also intrinsically good.16 
                                                 
12 Swanton herself treats honesty as a mere disposition to tell the truth (or at least not lie) 
and, as such, does not consider it to be a genuine virtue. On the other hand, she suggests 
that there is a distinct virtue “of a correct disposition with respect to divulging information.” 
It seems most natural to me to maintain that honesty is this latter virtue, rather than a mere 
disposition of truth-telling. See Swanton (2003), 246. 
13 And it is worth noting that respecting a person primarily involves certain attitudes and a 
valuing of the person herself; respect is not plausibly construed as a mere disposition to per-
form “respectful” actions. Again, it seems best to understand respectful actions as those that 
would be performed (or approved of) by a person with an attitude of respect (toward a given 
person or object). 
14 Thomas Hurka, Virtue, Vice, and Value (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
15 Hurka (2001), 12. Note that Hurka is not committed to this particular list of basic goods; 
he simply takes these to be plausible candidates. 
16 Hurka (2001), 13. 
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We can pass over certain features of Hurka’s account – he suggests a set of 
basic evils, and holds that loving what is evil is itself evil, while hating what is 
good is evil, and so on. The intuitive structure should be apparent. With this 
in hand, Hurka proposes the following definitions of moral virtue and vice: 
 
The moral virtues are those attitudes to goods and evils that are intrinsically good, 
and the moral vices are those attitudes to good and evils that are intrinsically evil.17 
 
Focusing on the virtues, we can now see how the objection might be sus-
tained. Hurka can allow that the virtues involve various modes of respon-
siveness to intrinsic goods (pursuing, taking pleasure in, etc.) while also hold-
ing that the value of these responses is explained by, and derivative from, the 
value of the basic goods. As he says, “In my view, virtue cannot plausibly be 
treated as morally primitive: it consists in an appropriate response to other 
moral considerations and must be analyzed in terms of those considera-
tions.”18  
A response to this proposal will emerge and be defended over the next 
two sections. But to anticipate somewhat: I will argue that the virtue theorist 
need not accept that there are basic intrinsic goods (pleasure, knowledge, 
etc.) or evils (pain, ignorance, etc.) that are prior to the attitudes of the virtu-
ous. That is, while there are obviously pleasures and pains, we can plausibly 
deny that these have a status of being independently, intrinsically good or 
evil. In turn, this will allow the possibility of understanding even these goods 
and evils in terms of the responses of the virtuous. 
 
II 
 
We can now turn to our second objection to the primacy of the virtues; in so 
doing, we will also arrive at a response to the final variant of the first. The 
first objection (and its variants) focused on the proposal that the virtues are, 
by their very nature, simply dispositions to follow rules or perform certain 
actions (as reflected in our common practice of attributing character traits to 
agents based upon their actions) – or that the value of the virtues can be un-
derstood simply in terms of their relationship to right actions or good states 
of affairs. The second objection draws upon the fact that we often pick out 
paradigmatic right (and wrong) actions or rules in our moral thinking without 
any appeal to virtuous people and their behavior. This fact about moral epis-
temology suggests that the rightness of these actions or rules is not derivative 
from the virtues in any way – after all, a good explanation of this epistemic 
fact would be that the right is explanatorily prior to the virtues (or the virtu-
ous), and that this reflects a metaphysical dependence of virtue upon the 
                                                 
17 Hurka (2001), 20. 
18 Hurka (2001), 42. 
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right. We could then understand virtuous people to be those who are dis-
posed to perform these actions or act in accordance with these rules.19 We 
would thus embrace the primacy of the right over the virtuous.  
To bring this out more clearly, consider the following examples. We can 
see that torturing puppies and children for pleasure is wrong directly; there is 
no need to appeal to how virtuous people would act. Similarly with acts of 
murder, rape, and so on; the actions are clearly wrong, and any appeal to the 
attitudes or behaviors of the virtuous in such cases seems superfluous at best. 
Upon reflection, we see that a rule forbidding lying (ceteris paribus) seems cor-
rect; again, there is no need to appeal to virtuous agents.  
The following passage from Jonathan Dancy (cited by Simon Kirchin) 
can be understood as capturing the underlying intuition: 
 
[T]aking our experience at face value, we judge it to be experience of the moral 
properties of actions and agents in the world. And if we are to work with the pre-
sumption that the world is the way our experience represents it to us as being, we 
should take it in the absence of contrary considerations that actions and agents do 
have the sorts of moral properties we experience in them. This is an argument 
about the nature of moral experience, which moves from that nature to the prob-
able nature of the world.20  
 
Focusing on actions, the claim is that we seem to experience them as having 
genuine, independent moral properties and, assuming that our experience of 
the world is generally accurate, this suggests that there are such properties of 
rightness, etc., in the world prior to our experiences. The virtues (or virtuous 
characters) cannot be explanatorily basic in such cases; rather, these actions 
are antecedently and independently wrong. Nor is the point merely epistemic 
– it would be wrong-headed to explain the wrongness of these actions by 
appeal to the virtuous. Torturing children is not wrong because good people 
would not do such things; it is wrong because, at the very least, it causes suf-
fering in an innocent. And we could understand virtuous people as those 
                                                 
19 The first objection is based on the claim that the essence of virtues must lie in being dis-
positions to perform certain actions (including, perhaps, maximizing the good). The second 
objection is based on the claim that we can simply see that a wide range of actions are right 
(or wrong), without any appeal to virtues; as such, the virtues cannot be explanatorily basic 
in these cases. 
20 Jonathan Dancy, “Two Conceptions of Moral Realism,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
supp. vol. 60 (1986), 172. Dancy’s paper is cited in Simon Kirchin, “Ethical Phenomenology 
and Metaethics,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (2003), 241-64, and is reprinted in James 
Rachels (ed.), Ethical Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). More broadly, there 
has been a resurgence of interest in ethical intuitionism, a view that (if correct) could under-
mine a pure virtue ethics. Philip Stratton-Lake notes that “Intuitionists hold that certain ba-
sic moral propositions are self-evident, and thus can be directly known by intuition.” On 
such views, the truth of such moral propositions is independent and prior to the judgments 
of the virtuous. See Philip Stratton-Lake (ed.), Ethical Intuitionism: Re-evaluations (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002). [Quotation from Stratton-Lake’s introduction to the vol-
ume, 18.] 
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who are disposed to act in accordance with these antecedently identified rules 
or actions. 
One line of response available to virtue ethicists would draw attention to 
the fact that when we consider such cases more closely, we find that we often 
need to appeal to the motives and character of an agent in order to fully de-
termine the moral status of the actions. For example, in the case of torturing 
children, we cannot explain the wrongness simply in terms of causing suffer-
ing in an innocent – after all, surgery might cause such suffering, too. The 
motives and intentions of an agent can be relevant to assessments of right-
ness and wrongness (even in apparently obvious cases). Similarly with our 
earlier case of giving someone flowers – if done out of certain appropriate 
motives, the act is loving and presumably right. But if the action is intended 
to set off the recipient’s allergies, the action is no longer loving (and, indeed, 
could be quite cruel or hateful). It seems that we often cannot fully character-
ize actions as right (or wrong, or praiseworthy, or loving, etc.) independently 
of an agent’s motives. If so, we would thus avoid a pure primacy of the right: 
instead, characterizing actions as right would (often) require appeal to such 
things as virtuous motives and intentions.21  
More broadly, the virtue theorist can grant that we seem to simply see 
some actions as right “directly,” without complicated reasoning about what 
virtuous people would do. But, crucially, when we do our moral thinking or 
respond morally to situations, we do not do so as blank slates. Ordinary peo-
ple possess various virtues to at least some degree. We may see torturing 
puppies as wrong immediately, but this is because we possess a basic com-
passion, sense of justice, and so forth. We see promising as providing a prima 
facie duty, but this is because we respect others and value the truth. Our re-
sponses depend, of course, on the kind of creature that we are and the kind 
of character that we possess. Perhaps there are Martians or robots who 
would not respond in these ways when presented with tortured puppies. It is 
far from clear that when we (basically decent, ordinary) humans respond to 
certain actions as wrong (or right) immediately, that we are responding to 
some prior, independent rightness to the actions themselves. Rather, it is 
                                                 
21 This proposal would also allow a virtue ethicist to embrace an intuitionism of the kind 
considered in the previous footnote, if she were to hold that any intuited moral propositions 
would require reference to virtuous motives or intentions. For further cases where the mo-
tives of actions are crucial to determining their rightness, see Michael Stocker’s classic “The 
Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories,” Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976), 453-66. While the 
current line of response would be appealing to many virtue ethicists, I personally worry that 
an appeal to motives will not always be required in determining the rightness of an action, 
and that (similarly) we cannot determine that an action is wrong simply because it is per-
formed out of vicious motives. For example, if Claire saves a drowning person from a river 
solely in order to receive a reward, it seems plausible to hold that she performs a right action, 
but with a vicious motive. I do not wish to take a stand here on whether appeals to an 
agent’s motives are always required in determining the rightness (or wrongness) of her ac-
tions, or whether bad motives thereby entail wrong actions. I will, however, next present an 
alternative response available to virtue ethicists who are unsure of the current response. 
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quite plausible to hold that our responses are the result of training, natural 
tendencies to sympathy, anticipating the responses of those around us, etc.22 
And, if this is correct, there is no difficulty in maintaining that the virtues are 
explanatorily basic, even in these cases. 
A further analogy will help to clarify the current proposal. Consider a 
normal, adult human living in a contemporary Western society, looking at a 
flag. Such a person will immediately see the Union Jack as a Union Jack, a 
symbol of the U.K., and will similarly see the American stars and stripes as a 
symbol of the United States. Indeed, it would be difficult for such a person 
to see an American flag as merely a series of colored lines and patterns rather 
than as a flag and symbol. But we have been trained about flags as symbols 
of nations – obviously a Martian or a human without such experience will 
not respond with immediate thoughts of the U.K. or the U.S. upon being 
presented with the same flags; indeed, presumably they will not even see 
them qua flags. And notice how implausible it would be to posit an inde-
pendent, prior “Britishness” that inheres in the Union Jack pattern, such that 
we are simply reacting to this innate Britishness when we see the flag imme-
diately as a symbol of the U.K. The current suggestion, then, is that, in a 
similar way, normal adults might “automatically” see the wrongness of cer-
tain actions, but that this is a result of training (combined perhaps with cer-
tain natural / evolved dispositions) – it need not be treated as a response to a 
prior, independent property of wrongness. And when philosophers react to 
thought experiments in ethics (and “immediately” perceive some actions to 
be wrong, others right), we do not do so as blank slates; we have developed 
character traits that shape our reactions. We thus do not need to posit ante-
cedently right actions even in those cases where we seem to simply see cer-
tain actions as right; the primacy of the virtues is unaffected. 
While this section has focused on responding to claims of the explana-
tory primacy of the right, lessons can be drawn for claims concerning the 
primacy of the good. Returning to Hurka and (the final variant of) the first 
objection, we can grant that it may similarly seem immediately obvious to us 
that pleasure, knowledge, and achievement are good, while pain and the like 
are intrinsically bad. But just as in the case of the obviously right and wrong 
actions considered in this section, we can plausibly deny that these states 
have their value-status independently of, or prior to, the judgments of the 
virtuous. Seeing pleasure as good need not involve perceiving an independ-
ent, prior value, any more than seeing the Union Jack as the flag of the U.K. 
needs to involve perceiving an independent, prior “Britishness” in the pat-
tern. We are decent people with evolved dispositions and training that lead us 
to such assessments. In the following section we will consider objections 
proposing the primacy of the good over the virtuous in greater depth.  
 
                                                 
22 Kirchin provides additional responses against this sort of appeal to ethical phenomenology 
as supporting a form of mind-independent moral realism. See Kirchin (2003), 248-51. 
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III 
 
The next objection to the virtue theorist grants that our intuitions and reac-
tions to various cases might be a result of our character and training, rather 
than being responses to independent rightness or wrongness in the world. 
But the question is pressed: why do virtuous people respond in these ways to 
these cases? Why do normal or good people respond negatively to acts of 
puppy-torturing or murder? Consider the following from a recent review es-
say by David Copp and David Sobel: 
 
It is facts about the alternatives a person must decide among, including such things 
as the impact the alternatives will have on people's ability to meet their needs, that 
determine what a person ought to do. It is not facts about what a virtuous person 
would want her to do, or facts about the motives that the person would actually be 
acting from if she were to do the various alternatives. If someone is drowning, for 
example, and if you can save her at no risk and at negligible cost to yourself, you 
ought to save her because otherwise her life will be wasted. It is because a life 
would otherwise be wasted that a virtuous person would want you to save her.23 
 
Surely helping a drowning person is right because it prevents the suffering 
and potential death of the victim and the loss of future goods for the person, 
her friends, and so on; it is not right simply because virtuous agents would 
save the person. One could thus plausibly argue that the virtuous are simply 
responding to states of affairs with intrinsic value (or disvalue), and that it is 
this intrinsic goodness (or badness) that is explanatorily basic. This, of 
course, brings to mind Hurka’s proposal concerning basic intrinsic goods. 
But a virtue theorist can hold that concerns with various states of affairs 
are essential components of the virtues. On the current approach, the virtue 
theorist can agree with Copp and Sobel that virtuous agents would concern 
themselves with the potential suffering and loss of life of the drowning vic-
tim (etc.); all that is being denied is that there are prior properties of good-
ness or badness that the virtuous are responding to. That is, the virtuous are 
responding to the potential suffering and loss of life itself; there is not a prior 
property of “badness” attaching to the potential suffering and loss of life that 
causes the virtuous to react as they do.   
For example, we notice that any unimpaired virtuous agent will be 
moved by suffering (and respond negatively to it), and will judge a state of 
affairs which includes suffering to be worse than a similar state of affairs 
without suffering.24 This leads us to an alternative way of understanding the 
moral status of suffering. Gary Watson suggests that 
 
                                                 
23 David Copp and David Sobel, “Morality and Virtue: An Assessment of Some Recent 
Work in Virtue Ethics,” Ethics 114 (2004), 514-54. Quotation from 552. 
24 At least in standard cases – we can put aside circumstances of punishment and so on for 
present purposes. 
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To be sure, a concern for outcomes will be internal to certain virtues. For instance, 
the benevolent person will be concerned that others fare well. But the moral sig-
nificance of this concern stems from the fact that it is part of a virtue, not from the 
fact that misery and well-being are intrinsically or ultimately bad and good respec-
tively. To put it another way, it will follow from an ethics of virtue that virtuous 
people care about things (and outcomes) for their own sakes (as final ends in them-
selves). There is no further commitment, however, to the idea that these concerns 
are virtuous ones because their objects are inherently valuable or desirable for their 
own sakes.25 
 
Thus the virtues will often lead us to value certain outcomes but, according 
to the virtue theorist, the moral status of these outcomes is determined by 
the reactions and attitudes of the virtuous. The virtuous are responding di-
rectly to states of affairs – but there are not prior moral properties superven-
ing on these states of affairs that are guiding the reactions of the virtuous. 
We thus have a plausible alternative to views like that of Hurka (that posit 
basic, independent intrinsic goods and evils in the world).  
Now it might seem again that the virtue theorist has placed the cart be-
fore the horse. Surely (for example) the pain of the puppies being tortured is 
fundamentally what makes such an action wrong, and an appeal to the atti-
tudes of virtuous agents misses the point. But note: the virtue theorist can 
entirely agree that virtuous agents respond negatively to torturing puppies 
precisely because of the pain that would be caused, and that, as such, it is because of the 
pain that would be caused that the action would be wrong. All that is being denied is 
the presence of any prior, independent goodness or badness (normative 
properties) that cause the reactions of the virtuous. We need to be careful to 
distinguish different senses of (and answers to) the question “Why is this ac-
tion wrong?”. 
To illustrate, consider a divine command theorist who holds that actions 
are right if and only if they are in accordance with God’s commands. Fur-
thermore, suppose that God commands us to act as act utilitarians. Finally, 
imagine a person contemplating the specific action of torturing puppies. 
Why, on this account, would it be wrong to torture puppies? We can distin-
guish three answers, corresponding to three senses of the question: 
 
Meta-ethical: It is wrong because it is contrary to God’s commands, and actions 
possess the property of wrongness insofar as they are not in accordance with God’s 
commands. 
Normative: It is wrong to torture puppies because doing so does not maximize 
utility (and thus is wrong according to the standards of act utilitarianism). 
Instantiation: It is wrong to torture puppies because it causes them terrible suffer-
ing. 
 
Notice then, that on this theory, one could say both that it is wrong to tor-
ture puppies because it is contrary to God’s commands, and that it is wrong 
                                                 
25 Gary Watson, “On the Primacy of Character” in Owen Flanagan (ed), Identity, Character, 
and Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990), 449-69. 
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to torture puppies because it causes them terrible suffering. The former an-
swers a meta-ethical question: what is it that makes actions (including this one) 
wrong? The latter answers the question of why is this particular action wrong?  
Or consider a different theory, a form of moral realism, according to 
which badness is a natural property that supervenes on various natural base 
properties (such as suffering), while goodness is a natural property that su-
pervenes on other base properties (such as happiness). Assume further that 
rightness supervenes on actions that maximize utility (where we can treat this 
simply as a matter of the net balance of goodness over badness produced); 
we might add a property of wrongness that supervenes on all other actions.26 
We essentially have a moral realist form of act utilitarianism. Now consider 
again the torturing of puppies. Why would it be wrong to do so? 
 
Meta-ethical: It is wrong to torture puppies because the property of rightness 
would not supervene on the action of torturing puppies (presumably because a 
great deal of badness would supervene on their suffering), while the property of 
wrongness would so supervene. 
Normative: It is wrong to torture puppies because doing so does not maximize 
utility. 
Instantiation: It is wrong to torture puppies because it causes them terrible suffer-
ing. 
 
Again, we need to distinguish various senses of our question: the torturing of 
puppies is wrong because the natural, supervenient property of rightness fails 
to supervene on the action while the property of wrongness does so super-
vene on the action; it is also wrong because it fails to maximize utility or the 
net balance of goodness over badness; and it is also wrong because of the 
puppies’ suffering itself.27 Each of these claims is equally correct and corre-
sponds to a different sense of the question “why is this action wrong?”. 
 
                                                 
26 Why do these moral properties supervene on the base properties that they do? The realist 
need not provide an explanation here, anymore than she needs to explain why the laws of 
physics or biology are as they are. This would simply be part of the nature of the world we 
live in. See Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defence (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), especially chapter 2. 
27 We can thus distinguish three senses in which one might claim that causing suffering is a 
wrong-making property. At the metaethical level this could be taken, as in the current exam-
ple, as a naturalistic realism where wrongness supervenes on causing suffering. At the nor-
mative level, the claim can be understood as stating that causing suffering is contrary to a 
given set of norms. Thus causing suffering will be a wrong-making property on most plausi-
ble normative theories. (And notice how a utilitarian emotivist could embrace the claim that 
causing suffering is a wrong-making property in this normative sense, even while denying the 
above metaethical claim; for the emotivist, the wrongness of causing suffering metaethically 
will be understood in terms of the attitudes of agents toward causing suffering). Finally, to 
hold that causing suffering is a wrong-making property in an instantive sense would be to 
hold that what explains the wrongness of some particular action, why it runs contrary to the 
norms at stake, and why it possesses the property of wrongness (understood as metaethical 
claim), is that this particular action involves causing suffering.  
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So what should the virtue theorist say here? I would suggest the follow-
ing: 
 
Metaethical: It is wrong to torture puppies because virtuous agents would not per-
form such actions (or would disapprove of them in some fashion), and such actions 
would thus possess the property of moral wrongness.  
Normative: It is wrong to torture puppies because virtuous agents [given their 
psychologies] would not perform or approve of such actions. These approvals and 
disapprovals do not follow a simple normative code like act utilitarianism. 
Instantiation: It is wrong to torture puppies because it causes them terrible suffer-
ing (which will lead to disapproval by virtuous agents due to their compassion and 
benevolence). 
 
The distinction between the responses to the metaethical and normative 
questions requires some elaboration. Intuitively, on the current proposal, vir-
tue theories are metaethical rivals to various moral realisms (where these ba-
sic realist properties are goodness or rightness), contractualisms, and other 
non-realist positions. But they are also normative theories and, at the norma-
tive level, they are rivals to consequentialist and deontological theories. 
Compare a slightly modified version of the theory: suppose that virtuous 
agents would approve of or endorse act utilitarianism.28 If this were so, we 
would keep the same metaethical answer, but our normative answer would 
now be that torturing puppies is wrong as it does not maximize utility. On 
the actual proposed account, it is held that the approvals and behaviors of 
virtuous agents do not follow a simple set of normative rules; as such, we 
appeal directly to the approvals or behaviors of virtuous agents at the norma-
tive level. 
The instantiation question can be understood as asking why a particular 
action is such that it fails to meet the criteria of rightness given at the norma-
tive level. And here the virtue theorist’s answer is that it is the suffering of 
the puppies that makes torturing them wrong. Virtuous people will be moved 
by such suffering; if the suffering were not present, they would not have the 
reactions that they do. The virtuous, given their particular psychologies, will 
respond negatively to actions because of such features as causing unnecessary 
suffering, being a case of lying, and so on. It is precisely because of the pup-
pies’ suffering that virtuous agents will deem torturing them to be wrong; in 
this (instantiation) sense, torturing puppies is wrong because it causes them 
to suffer. We thus need to clearly distinguish between why the virtuous will 
have the responses that they have, and the nature of moral properties. The 
virtue theorist can at once say both that actions of harming puppies are 
wrong because of the suffering caused (this will be what concerns the virtu-
ous and causes them not to approve of such actions), and because the virtu-
ous would respond negatively to the action (where this latter can be under-
                                                 
28 We might imagine here (as with our divine command example) that the psychology of 
these virtuous agents (or God) is such that they are so deeply moved by suffering and happi-
ness that they endorse a form of act utilitarianism. 
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stood as both a normative or a metaethical claim).  
With this in hand, we can see more clearly the error in the objection. Re-
call Copp and Sobel’s statement: 
 
It is facts about the alternatives a person must decide among, including such things 
as the impact the alternatives will have on people’s ability to meet their needs, that 
determine what a person ought to do. It is not facts about what a virtuous person 
would want her to do, or facts about the motives that the person would actually be 
acting from if she were to do the various alternatives. 
 
Copp and Sobel’s objection confuses the instantiation and normative (and 
metaethical) senses of the question “Why is this action right / wrong?” The 
virtue theorist can entirely agree that, in one fundamental sense, it is precisely 
preventing the potential loss of life and suffering that would make saving a 
drowning person right. To see the flaw in this sort of objection, compare 
parallel objections to normative and metaethical rivals to virtue theories: 
 
Utilitarianism: “But don’t you see – torturing puppies is not wrong because it fails 
to maximize happiness or preference-satisfaction or anything abstract like that! It is 
wrong because the puppies would suffer.” Notice that a utilitarian could properly 
hold that torturing puppies is wrong at the instantiation level precisely because of 
the suffering caused – and that it is because of this suffering that such actions fail 
to maximize happiness. The utilitarian is not overlooking the puppies’ suffering. 
Kantianism: “Killing a person is not wrong because doing so fails to satisfy the 
Categorical Imperative! It is wrong because you are ending a person’s life and end-
ing all of her possibilities, etc.” Notice that a Kantian could properly hold that kill-
ing a person is wrong because of lost opportunities, suffering, and so on (at the in-
stantiation level). And insofar as this is the case, such actions will not satisfy the 
Categorical Imperative (they will not reflect universalizable maxims, or they will in-
volve treating the victim as a means only, etc.). 
Supervenient Non-Natural Properties (a metaethical rival): “Torturing puppies 
is not wrong because there is some mysterious non-natural moral property that su-
pervenes upon such actions! It is wrong because of the suffering of the puppies!” 
Again, notice that someone could hold both that the wrongness of the action sim-
ply is a matter of its possessing a supervening, non-natural property (metaethically), 
and that it is precisely because of the suffering of the puppies that “wrongness” 
would supervene on actions of puppy-torturing. The objection confuses the instan-
tiation and metaethical senses in which an action is wrong. 
 
Recall that (on the present account) the virtue theorists’ claim is that it is the 
reactions of the virtuous that give actions, events, etc., their moral status. 
Briefly put: humans are creatures who have evolved over time with a range of 
tastes, dispositions, common preferences, and so on. It could be a mere de-
scriptive fact about most humans that they care about the suffering involved 
in puppy-torturing – the mere result of social training and certain common 
human emotional dispositions. More broadly, while we find pains to be un-
pleasant, and have an aversion to them, this can all be understood descrip-
tively: the mere fact that we are averse to pains does yet justify holding that 
pains must be intrinsically bad. There is a gap between the descriptive and 
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the normative here. On the current proposal, what changes things – what 
turns a mere disapproval common among many humans – into moral wrong-
ness (or badness) is the fact that particular kinds of agents under particular 
kinds of conditions would share a disapproval of this sort. It is the fact that 
virtuous agents in particular, (with their particular psychologies and disposi-
tions), would have negative reactions that makes such acts morally wrong and 
the pains morally bad (at the metaethical and normative levels) – rather than 
merely displeasing to most humans. But at the same time, there is no need to 
downplay the importance of the suffering involved in puppy-torturings (or 
our own pains) on the virtue theorists’ view; indeed this suffering will be the 
focus of the concerns of the virtuous (and the reason why the action is 
wrong, in the instantiation sense). The only claim is that these actions, states 
of affairs, and so forth take on a moral status insofar as virtuous individuals in 
particular will have certain attitudes toward them. There are not prior, inde-
pendent moral facts toward which the virtuous merely respond. 
We can turn to a final variation of this worry: it could be objected that 
even if virtuous agents are not responding to antecedent rightness, intrinsic 
goodness or what-have-you, they are simply responding appropriately to 
relevant features of given situations. That is, even if there is not a prior prop-
erty of wrongness that the virtuous are responding to, it is the suffering of 
tortured puppies itself (for example) that makes the attitudes of the virtuous 
(disapproval) appropriate or justified. There are features of situations which 
make certain attitudes appropriate – it is such features that give the attitudes 
of the virtuous their status as morally appropriate, rather than the attitudes of 
the virtuous determining the moral status of these features themselves. As 
such, the virtuous and their attitudes would not be explanatorily basic. 
While this objection has a certain initial appeal, we need to bear in mind 
the discussion of section II. True, it seems that suffering warrants disap-
proval or hatred – and this might strike us as an immediate judgment. But 
again, we “ordinary folk” typically have at least somewhat virtuous charac-
ters, and have been trained to react in certain ways – so we tend to think that 
the suffering of others makes disapproval appropriate. There is no need to 
hold that it is an antecedent, independent fact that pleasure warrants or justi-
fies approval. Rather, we can plausibly hold that through training and “natu-
ral” human tendencies, we will come to deem such things as pain, pleasure, 
knowledge, and achievement as warranting certain attitudes on our part.    
 
IV 
 
The next objection can be understood as a dilemma for the virtue theorist 
that arises if we grant that neither the good nor the right are explanatorily 
prior to the virtuous. It is perhaps worth noting that similar objections can be 
raised against ideal observer theories, and that they bear a striking resem-
blance to the Euthyphro dilemma commonly raised against divine command 
theories. Indeed, the objection is perhaps best understood as a form of the 
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Euthyphro dilemma applied to virtue ethics. Peter Singer provides a clear 
statement of the dilemma, as posed for the divine command theorist: 
 
If all values result from God’s will, what reason could God have for willing what he 
does? If killing is wrong only because God said: “Thou shalt not kill,” God might just as 
easily have said: “Thou shalt kill.” Would killing then have been right? To agree that it 
would have been right makes morality too arbitrary; but to deny that it would have been 
right is to assume that there are standards of right and wrong independent of God’s 
will.29 
 
The application to a pure virtue-theorist’s approach should be apparent. Julia 
Driver puts the issue as follows, with respect to right action: 
 
it seems natural to ask the further question, “Why would the virtuous agent advise me 
to do A?” If the answer is simply that what the virtuous agent advises determines right 
action, independent of any other reasons or considerations, then the account seems 
quite capricious; if, on the other hand, there are independent reasons, then aren’t those 
the right-making features – and then isn’t what the virtuous agent advises superfluous?30  
 
Intuitively, either the actions (or approvals and disapprovals) of virtuous 
agents follow some set of independent standards of rightness or goodness (in 
which case these are fundamental, not the attitudes of virtuous agents), or 
else the actions and approvals of the virtuous are simply arbitrary (which, in 
turn, makes such an ethics arbitrary and not worthy of our concern). 
What can be said in response? While there are certain dangers in appeal-
ing to the color / secondary quality model in understanding virtue theories, it 
will be instructive in the present case as a starting point. We are trying to find 
a model that allows us to hold that virtuous agents are not simply appealing 
to prior standards of rightness and wrongness, while also not simply arbitrar-
ily approving of some things, disapproving of others. Consider now colors. It 
is considered quite plausible among many that color properties are not prop-
erly understood entirely independently of the reactions of observers. For ex-
ample, if we consider objects that are yellow, it seems highly unlikely that we 
would group just these objects together were it not for the reactions of nor-
mal observers under normal circumstances. The same would be true with 
other colors. We “carve up” the world in a way that would seem rather arbi-
trary were it not for the existence of human observers with common, shared 
reactions to these objects.  
Yet this is not arbitrary. Given our human visual systems, the world will 
affect us in common, predictable ways (and we cannot simply choose to see 
things otherwise). Light with a wavelength of near 660nm will appear red to 
us; with a wavelength of near 410nm it will appear as violet; at near 570nm it 
                                                 
29 Peter Singer, The Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology (New York: Farrar, Strauss & 
Giroux, 1981), x. 
30 Julia Driver, “Virtue Theory,” in James Dreier, ed., Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), 113-23; quotation from 118. 
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will appear to be yellow, and so on. We will carve up the world on this basis, 
but surely would not do so without our given perceptual faculties; for exam-
ple, the range of wavelengths that is seen as red is much wider than the blue 
range (that is, colors do not nicely line up into equal, say, 50nm ranges. Blue 
is quite a narrow band of the spectrum).31 Outside of a narrow range of 
wavelengths, approximately 400-700nm, light is no longer visible to humans, 
and we do not divide the electromagnetic spectrum into colors outside of 
this range.  
Here we can return to how we ought to model the virtue theorists’ un-
derstanding of rightness, goodness, and other moral properties. Virtuous 
agents, given their psychological dispositions, will often immediately respond 
in certain ways to various events, actions, and so forth. As in the case of col-
ors, we could perhaps arrive at a complex rule (or set of rules) that corre-
sponds to their approvals and disapprovals. But crucially these rules could 
simply be a reflection or summary of the immediate reactions of the virtuous; 
the virtuous themselves need not appeal to a set of rules (or a prior good-
ness) in arriving at their simple reactions. For example, benevolent agents, 
given their psychologies, will tend to be moved by instances of pain or suf-
fering. But there is no need to posit a prior, intrinsic badness to these pains, 
nor a prior set of moral rules to explain the regularity of these responses of 
benevolent agents.  
Still, as noted above, appeal to the color analogy is not without its dan-
gers and we now need to address a disanalogy. In the case of colors, normal 
observers do not typically engage in reasoning to determine what color they 
are seeing. But while in many cases virtuous agents will have immediate reac-
tions (as with benevolent agents being immediately moved by suffering), they 
also engage in moral reasoning. They often need to weigh conflicting consid-
erations to arrive at considered judgments – which is quite unlike what oc-
curs in normal color perception. And even the immediate, simple reactions 
of the virtuous can be the result of training (as noted in section II). We arrive 
at a variation of the original dilemma: how do virtuous agents engage in 
moral reasoning? It seems that either they would appeal to the right or to the 
good, or their “reasoning” would be unconstrained, arbitrary, and quite pos-
sibly inconsistent. 
To see a way through, we need to bear in mind that the virtuous, given 
their psychologies, will tend to be moved by certain states of affairs (e.g., 
honest agents will tend to have negative reactions to acts of lying). Similarly, 
they will be inclined toward embracing certain rules of thumb (given their 
concern with the truth, honest agents will tend to endorse rules of thumb 
that prohibit lying in most circumstances). But notice that these approvals 
and reactions are grounded in the psychologies of the virtuous, rather than 
being responses to explanatorily prior rightness or goodness. When there are 
                                                 
31 And there are, of course, further complications. For example, light of two different wave-
lengths can be perceived by the human eye as a third color.  
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conflicts between a virtuous agent’s concerns (rules of thumb that appeal to 
her, particular reactions to a case at hand, etc.) she can attempt to achieve a 
reflective equilibrium among these various components. And notice that the 
reflective equilibrium she will achieve will reflect her virtuous dispositions. 
Intuitively, there will be a significant difference between how a Hitleresque 
character would arrive at a reflective equilibrium, and the equilibrium that 
would be achieved by Albert Schweitzer. Presumably the virtuous agent will 
strive for consistency (her disposition toward justice or fairness would seem 
to require this), thus avoiding arbitrariness or inconsistency. We thus arrive at 
the following: the virtuous, given their concerns and dispositions, will at-
tempt to achieve a reflective equilibrium; the very equilibrium they arrive at 
will in turn be shaped by their dispositions (and again, their inclinations to-
ward justice will ensure a desire for consistency). There is no need to appeal 
to an explanatorily prior rightness or goodness. We thus arrive at a way 
through the dilemma: the reactions of the virtuous are regular and consistent 
(avoiding the second horn), but are not the result of following of some prior 
set of rules or goodness (avoiding the first horn). 
 
V 
 
And this leads us to a final objection. The objector might grant that there is a 
concern for certain states of affairs built into the various virtues. But then we 
arrive at a fundamental question. How do we pick out the virtues? And here 
a plausible story would hold that various character traits are virtues because 
they include a concern for states of affairs (or action-guiding principles) that 
are independently valuable (or disvaluable). Benevolence is a virtue, while 
malevolence is not, because benevolence involves a concern for the happi-
ness or well-being of others, where happiness is independently valuable. Wil-
liam Frankena provides a clear, classic presentation of the objection: 
 
[O]ne cannot conceive of traits of character except as including dispositions and ten-
dencies to act in certain ways in certain circumstances. Hating involves being disposed 
to kill or harm, being just involves tending to do just acts (acts that conform to the 
principle of justice) when the occasion calls. Again, it is hard to see how we could know 
what traits to encourage or inculcate if we did not subscribe to principles, for example, 
to the principle of utility, or to those of benevolence and justice.32 
 
The question, then, is whether we can give an account of the virtues (includ-
ing a story about what makes given traits virtues) that does not boil down to 
having a concern for independently (and explanatorily prior) right actions, 
principles, or good states of affairs.  
Here I would argue that such independent accounts are clearly possible, 
while conceding that most of the accounts that have in fact been offered 
would be inadequate for current purposes. Thus, appeals to developing hu-
                                                 
32 William Franekena, Ethics 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1973), 65. 
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man nature (or leading a flourishing human life) have been frequently en-
dorsed, where the virtues are taken as essential to human nature (or leading a 
eudaimon life).33 On such accounts we might hold that benevolence is a virtue 
as it is essential to developing our human nature (as social, rational animals), 
or because it is necessary to leading a flourishing human life. Notice that we 
would not necessarily need to appeal to prior morally right actions or good 
states of affairs in establishing the virtues. As such, we would have an inde-
pendent account of the virtues that would anchor the responses to the objec-
tions discussed throughout this paper. On the other hand, most proponents 
of such accounts (including Hursthouse) explicitly appeal to moralized ac-
counts of human nature; such accounts would likely not serve our present 
purposes of avoiding Frankena’s charge.34 Still, we might find a satisfactory 
account along these lines, as philosophers continue to develop and refine 
such approaches.35  
And, of course, other accounts are possible. One promising path would 
involve (roughly) appealing to those character traits that we would come to 
value in a society’s members, given full information (about the probable ef-
fects of various traits and so on). Rather than appealing to human nature, we 
could appeal to those traits that we would value in people, in light of full in-
formation. Again, this would allow us to pick out traits as virtues without 
assuming explanatorily prior morally right actions or good states of affairs. 
Variations of this general approach are also available.  
There is thus admittedly a rather large promissory note left to be paid in 
explaining what marks off traits as virtues. But this is not a circumstance 
unique to virtue theories,36 and there are promising avenues for virtue theo-
rists to explore in discharging such debts. Here I hope only to have cleared 
                                                 
33 While there are important differences between their various accounts of human nature and 
flourishing, we could include as examples of this general approach: Aristotle, Nichomachean 
Ethics, Terence Irwin, trans. (Cambridge: Hackett, 1985), William D. Casebeer, Natural Ethi-
cal Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition (Cambridge: The MIT Press, A Bradford 
Book, 2003), Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 
Rosalind Hursthouse (1999), and James D. Wallace, Virtues and Vices (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1978). 
34 This would depend on the details of any given moralized account of human nature or 
flourishing – does the account make reference to explanatorily prior right actions or the 
good? If so, the account would not suffice for our current purposes. 
35 See, for example, Thomas Hurka, Perfectionism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
Hurka attempts to avoid moralizing his account of human nature, but explicitly acknowl-
edges that the resulting perfectionism will fail to include many commonsense virtues (while 
suggesting that perhaps his perfectionism could be supplemented with additional moral con-
tent to capture more of commonsense morality). There may be other ways in which one 
might develop a non-moralized perfectionism, approaches that might capture more of com-
monsense morality.  
36 That is to say, a broad range of important theories (in ethics and elsewhere) face important 
challenges, and have lacunae that must eventually be filled. 
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the ground of several important initial objections to the claim that the virtues 
could be explanatorily basic in a viable moral theory.37 
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37 Early versions of this paper were presented at meetings of the Pacific Division of the 
American Philosophical Association and of the Tennessee Philosophical Association. I 
would like to thank my commentators (Dan Farnham and Dina Garmong) and audiences for 
their comments. Thanks also to those who discussed certain ideas from this paper on the 
ethics blog, PEAsoup (http://peasoup.typad.com/peasoup) – Ben Bradley, Campbell 
Brown, Jamie Dreier, Josh Glasgow, Troy Jollimore, and Scott Wilson. Finally, I would like 
to thank Ron Sandler, Gretchen von Schwinn, and the anonymous referees of this paper for 
their very helpful comments. 
